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Introduction
The civil war in Sri Lanka, which came to an end with the military defeat of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, has been internationalized since a few years after its inception in the 1980s (Oberst 2004) . 1 While several actors around the globe were involved in this conflict in different ways, the actor most heavily and most consistently entangled in the Sri Lankan civil war has been India, the "regional power" in South Asia. Different kinds of negative security externalities (Lepgold 2003: 19-20) have affected India over the past few decades: the steady stream of Tamil refugees escaping the island, the formation of an LTTE network in the South of India and, most notably, the great interest in Sri Lankan af- (ICG 2010) , the displacement of thousands of people-mainly Tamils, and huge losses among the civilian population. Given such a dramatic situation taking place in close proximity to India and emotionally involving Indian Tamils living in Tamil Nadu-represented by parties belonging to the governing coalition in New Delhi-we would have expected regional power India to have acted decisively. In particular, we would have assumed that India would adopt conflict-management measures in order to prevent the escalation of violence in its immediate vicinity. In the case of Sri Lanka, this expectation would have been reinforced by India's tradition of involvement in Sri Lankan affairs, and since India has repeatedly emphasized its preference for a peaceful solution and a political settlement of the ethnic conflict. However, it turned out that India did not, in fact, act as a conflict manager and did not actively engage to stop the violence in Sri How can we explain, on one hand, this lack of influence on the part of the "regional power" India, which contradicts predominant assumptions about the ability and willingness of powerful regional states to effectively shape regional order and to take the initiative in the management of conflicts in their own region? And how can we make sense, on the other hand, of India's 2007 policy shift, which stands in contrast to its previous "hands-off" policy towards the war in Sri Lanka?
To answer these questions, this paper first discusses the basic assumptions of existing theories about regional conflict management and the foreign policy of regional powers (Section 2). Some recent approaches, which call into question predominant tenets about the ability of powerful regional states to actively and substantially influence events taking place in their adjacency, are discussed. Against this background, this paper proceeds as a systematic case study: Section 3 sketches the origins of the civil war and India's early involvement in it and outlines the main events in the final phase of the war (Eelam War IV). In Section 4, India's policies on the war in Sri Lanka during the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] are assessed, highlighting a shift that took place in 2007, when New Delhi started distancing itself from its previously neutral approach by supporting the military efforts of the Sri Lankan government. For the analysis of diplomatic statements, I carried out a qualitative content analysis of official documents, speeches, statements and parliament debates reported by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, while the press and secondary literature serve as sources for the assessment of India's "non-verbal" foreign policy. Several expert interviews carried out in India from October to December 2008 serve as complementary sources. Section 5 attempts to make sense Destradi: India and the Civil War in Sri Lanka: On the Failures of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia 7 both of India's inability to act as a conflict manager and of this shift in India's policies by taking into consideration a range of historical, domestic, regional and international factors. Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions and outlines some areas of further research for the study of the foreign policy of regional powers and for the field of regional conflict management.
Managing Regional Security
After the end of the Cold War, a remarkable shift in the distribution of types of armed conflict took place worldwide: with the end of great power overlay and the sudden disappearance of proxy wars, the largest number of wars took place at the intra-state level (Harbom/ Wallensteen 2010) . At the same time, since the 1990s we have observed a trend towards the regionalization of conflict-management initiatives (Alagappa 1995) . This was related, among other factors, to the "overstretch" of the United Nations and the reluctance of the United States to get involved in conflict-management initiatives, especially in remote regions (Bercovitch/Jackson 2009: 122). As a consequence, the UN started promoting forms of "regional task sharing" (ibid.: 119-136)-delegating competences to regional organizations. However, in the case of South Asia, which lacks any kind of multilateral security arrangement because the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) explicitly excludes contentious and political issues from its areas of activity, "conflict management is essentially a bilateral possibility" (Bajpai 2003: 212) . Under these conditions, in the absence of multilateral initiatives involving regional states, studies on regional conflict management would expect a "solo actor" to undertake some initiatives to deal with a conflict taking place in the region (Lepgold 2003: 17) .
Most studies on "regional powers" would make a similar assessment. This growing body of literature deals with countries like Brazil, South Africa, India, China and Russia-states that have predominant power positions in their regions and that aspire to lead the region to which they belong (Flemes/Nolte 2010) . The ability to influence their region has often been taken as a constitutive trait of regional powers (Østerud 1992: 12; Schirm 2005: 111; Nolte 2010: 889) , which, thanks to their endowment with power capabilities, are considered to be able to determine not only the geopolitical delimitation of their region, its political-normative construction and regional governance structures, but also the regional security agenda (ibid.: 893).
According to both these approaches, India as the predominant country-the regional power-in South Asia and as a state directly affected by spill-over effects from the civil war in Sri Lanka should have played a prominent and active role in managing the Sri Lankan conflict according to its preferences. India's unequivocal preponderance of material power capabilities at the regional level, further strengthened by its geopolitical position as the center of a hub-and-spokes regional setting, would reinforce our assumption of India's ability to influence its region according to its wishes. In the vital policy area of conflict management, this should hold true even more, especially with a decades-long, bloody civil war at stake. Some recent studies are more helpful when it comes to making sense of India's approach towards Sri Lanka. In dealing with regional powers, some authors have started acknowledging that "leadership" is only one of the qualities that a regional power can display (Frazier/ Stewart-Ingersoll 2010) ; that these countries can pursue different strategies in dealing with their smaller neighbors (Destradi 2010) ; and that different forms of "regional powerhood" can be established by dominant states (Prys 2010) . Schirm (2010) and Flemes/Wojczewski (2010) have highlighted that leadership may be "contested" and that, in order to effectively "lead," regional powers depend on the support of followers. The most suitable theoretical development for addressing the puzzle of India's indecisive and passive approach to the escalation of the civil war in Sri Lanka comes from Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll's study on regional security (2010) . While the authors argue that regional powers play a central role in conflict management in their region, they highlight that not only a range of "roles," but also different "orientations" can shape the behavior of dominant regional states. In particular,
Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll highlight that regional powers may be proactive or reactive in dealing with security concerns in their region. These two orientations can be distinguished by the specificity and immediacy of the regional power's motivations: diffuse and long-termoriented actions directed at influencing the regional security context are defined as proactive, while ad hoc responses to single events or actions are indicative of a reactive orientation.
In this paper I will apply these categories to the empirical analysis of India's role in the final years of the civil war in Sri Lanka (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ). As we will see, historical factors related to India's previous failures in conflict management in Sri Lanka played a part in "pulling India out" of the war, while domestic factors related to Tamil Nadu's interest in the conflict continuously "pushed India in," leading to a reactive and indecisive policy. The shift in India's policies that took place in 2007 was determined by a range of factors at the regional and international level.
The Civil War in Sri Lanka
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, rooted in the discrimination against the Tamil minority by 
India's Early Involvement
India initially played a significant role in this conflict as Sri Lanka's dominant neighbor. In the early 1980s, the government of Tamil Nadu and the central government under Indira Gandhi had supported Tamil rebel groups by providing them with military assistance and training, and this all on Indian territory (Dixit 2003: 55; dos Santos 2007: 54) . However, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi, her son Rajiv (see below) took a more neutral stance on the issue and officially interrupted the military support for Sri Lankan Tamil rebels. Instead, India clearly assumed a conflict-management role and repeatedly attempted to mediate between the conflict parties in the 1980s (Rao 1988) . The failed mediation efforts and the escalation of violence in Sri Lanka ultimately forced India to abandon its temporary neutral stance. After three years, given the increasingly evident failure of the IPKF, which was not adequately trained for a guerrilla war (Rajagopalan 2008) , India withdrew its troops. The IPKF debacle deeply influenced India's approach to conflict management in the region by highlighting the limits of India's military power and the risks of interventionist policies. It is no coincidence that India hasn't attempted a military intervention in the region since, and that its Gujral Doctrine, based on the notions of non-intervention and non-reciprocity in relations with regional neighbors, was formulated just a few years later.
The second main event shaping India's policy towards the Sri Lankan conflict in the following years was the assassination of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi by a suicide bomber in Tamil Nadu in May 1991. After the Indian Supreme Court attributed the assassination to the LTTE as an act of revenge for the IPKF operation, the LTTE was classified as a terrorist organization in India, and its leader, Prabhakaran, became a wanted man in India. 2 The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi heavily influenced New Delhi's approach to the civil war in Sri Lanka, and presumably even more strongly influenced the approach of the Congress- At the same time, India refused to take part in multilateral initiatives regarding Sri Lanka, for example in donor conferences. As one interviewee put it, "at the donor conferences India was present as an observer but it would not join a multilateral agreement in its own region!" Interview with expert, New Delhi, November 25, 2008. In an unprecedented military offensive, Sri Lankan government forces gradually re-conquered the territories under LTTE control-the East in 2007 and, step by step, also the Northern province. When the Sri Lankan military crossed the border of the Kilinochchi district, the displacement of a huge number of civilians-estimated to be as high as 200,000-began (Fuller 2009 ). On January 2, 2009, the city of Kilinochchi, which had been the Tigers' administrative capital since 1995, fell into the hands of the government forces after a long siege.
Trapped between the advancing Sri Lankan armed forces and the retreating LTTE rebels, the civilians were used by the LTTE as human shields and subjected to "intentional shelling" by the government forces (ICG 2010: i) . By mid-January 2009, the LTTE had been confined to a small jungle area in the Mullaithivu district, a space that continued to shrink up until the The civilians who managed to escape from the conflict zone were subject to a "screening" by the government, which feared that LTTE cadres might have mingled with the refugees. Approximately 250,000 IDPs were put in militarily controlled refugee camps, to which international aid agencies were given only partial access. Even though many countries pressured Colombo, they did not manage to induce a policy change on the part of the Sri Lankan gov- (ICG 2010: 31) . The Sri Lankan regime, in the meantime, has been assuming increasingly authoritarian traits, exemplified by the power concentrated in Rajapaksa's family's hands, an almost total lack of press freedom (Schlütter 2010: 1), about 10,000 Sri Lankan citizens being held for over a year for assumed involvement in LTTE activities (ICG 2010: 31) , an increasingly militarized governance culture (Senanayake 2009: 824) , and no signs of willingness to find a political situation providing for a meaningful devolution of power to the Tamil minority. 
India's Approach to Sri Lanka during Eelam War IV
At the beginning of the period analyzed, India refused to act as a conflict manager in the Sri Lankan war and followed the same approach it had been pursuing since the proscription of the LTTE after Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated: a strict policy of non-interference. However, despite its unwillingness to be dragged into the conflict again or to contribute to its solution, India was not indifferent to what happened in Sri Lanka. Besides keeping an eye on the unfolding of events, India also had some clear preferences for the resolution of the civil war.
Since the 1980s, when it had tried to mediate a compromise in Thimphu (Bouffard/Carment 2006: 168) , New Delhi had been interested in a political solution to the ethnic conflict. Despite the failures of the agreement of 1987 and of the IPKF deployment, those two undertakings had also aimed to achieve a peaceful settlement. Similarly, during the years of Norwegian mediation, the goal of "lasting peace" became a standard formulation in India's declara- weapons to Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government, for its part, had always been interested in gaining India's military support in its fight against the LTTE and had tried to promote the idea of a defense-cooperation agreement. 14 However, due to the political pressure from Tamil Nadu, the deal was ultimately not finalized, and in 2005 India rejected a renewed offer of a defense pact made by President Rajapaksa (Reddy 2007 Overall, therefore, the assistance provided by India to Sri Lanka was "significant," according to the International Crisis Group (ICG 2008: 20 
Explaining India's Inability to Manage the Conflict and Its 2007 Policy Shift
In an effort to explain not only why India did not act as a conflict manager in Sri Lanka but also why it changed its policy in 2007-abandoning its hands-off stance and its traditional support for Sri Lankan Tamils, and embracing the Sri Lankan government's preferences-we will look at a range of factors. In fact, Indian policymakers were exposed to different kinds of pressures at different levels of analysis, but ultimately the skillful diplomacy of the Sri Lankan government and the growing influence of external actors, especially of China, in India's sphere of influence induced New Delhi to "react" to events in order not to entirely lose its leverage on Sri Lanka.
Historical and Domestic Factors
As outlined above, the dismal failure of the IPKF operation and the assassination of Rajiv
Gandhi forced India to assume a "hands-off" approach and to remain on the sidelines. Any vented India from acting as a mediator or as a facilitator to achieve a negotiated solution.
Therefore, historical factors contribute largely to explaining India's inability to act as a conflict manager during Eelam War IV. At the same time, however, domestic political factors constantly dragged India into Sri Lankan affairs. In particular, the pro-LTTE attitude of some political parties in Tamil Tamils-as well as of the DMK's influence (Murari 2009 ). However, this should not be overstated: the DMK's room to maneuver was limited, in fact, by coalition politics in Tamil Nadu, where the Congress played a vital role in supporting its minority state government (Devotta 2010: 48) . This explains how Tamil Nadu's pro-Tamil politics influenced the central government and contributed to the latter's indecisive policies, but not to the extent of being able to prevent New Delhi's ultimate support for Rajapaksa's offensive. As we will see, this support was clearly related to other factors.
Regional Factors: Sri Lanka's Skillful Diplomacy
While historical constraints pulled India out of the war and domestic political factors pushed India towards it, the Sri Lankan government also had a strong interest in gaining India's support against the Tigers. The strengthening of economic ties and a policy of balancing with India's rivals China and Pakistan were the main tools employed by President Rajapaksa.
At the economic level, Indo-Sri Lankan relations had developed positively since the 1990s. In December 1998, the two countries had signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Bilateral Free (Athukorala 2009: 130) . Therefore, India's sudden support for the government's military offensive and for its positions on power devolution and human rights should rather be explained by looking at international factors, chief among those being India's fear of losing influence over South Asia to China.
International Factors: Indo-Chinese Competition
In the context of China's growing involvement in South Asia (e.g., Scott 2008: 256-257) , the Sri Lankan government greatly strengthened its ties with Beijing during the period analyzed. This occurred by means of economic cooperation, the construction of huge infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, and China's provision of weapons for the Sri Lankan government's fight against the LTTE. This gradual increase in Chinese influence in Sri Lanka clearly clashed with India's unstated goals of "having its say" in the South Asian region, 34 and "pre-29 Data on non-plan grants and loans from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs are reported in Price (2004: 13) .
See also MEA, India, Sri Lanka-Factsheet, at: <http://meaindia.nic.in/foreignrelation/srilanka.pdf> (May 30, 2009) and MEA, India, Visit of External Affairs Minister to Sri Lanka, June 9-11, 2005 , June 9, 2005 See "Sri Lanka tsunami aid becomes geopolitical game," LankaNewspapers. To put it simply, India was interested in limiting Sri Lankan arms procurements from thirdparty countries and therefore preferred to fill the gap itself. 38 How can we explain, however, India's much broader support for Rajapaksa's course of action, which implied embracing the president's position on devolution and supporting the Sri Lankan motion at the UNHRC-at the expense of India's traditional support for Sri Lankan Tamils (Devotta 2010: 54) ? Also in this case, the desire not to lose its influence in Sri Lankan affairs seems to have played a major role in New Delhi's foreign policy decision-making. China's influence in Sri Lanka, in fact, goes well beyond the provision of weapons and the construction of the Hambantota port:
further infrastructure projects are being carried out, China has been awarded an exclusive economic zone, and it provides aid packages of US$ 1 billion annually to Sri Lanka (Pant 2010) .
All this has led to efforts on the part of India to equally cajole the Sri Lankan government:
"India is struggling to make itself more relevant to Sri Lanka than China" (ibid.). As a conse- 
Conclusion
India's approach to the final phase of the armed hostilities in Sri Lanka allows us to draw several important conclusions on the foreign policy options of regional powers as well as on regional conflict management.
First, this case illustrates the limitations a regional power may encounter in trying to influence a smaller state in its vicinity-the former's overwhelming dominance notwithstanding. In fact, India was not able to transform its traditional preference for a political settlement of the conflict and partial devolution of powers to the Tamil minority into reality. As we have seen, the Sri Lankan government was able, instead, to gain not only India's acquiescence but even India's support in its fight against the LTTE and in its challenging of the international community-partly contributing, perhaps, to a change in preferences on the part of New
Delhi. The case of Sri Lanka reveals that we need to go beyond the purely regional and international factors cited by most studies on regional powers if we want to explain these countries' foreign policies: historical and domestic factors also need to be taken into account.
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Concerning the radar mentioned by Narayanan, India managed to dissuade Sri Lanka from buying it from China and provided it itself (Reddy 2007a Third, if we look at the issue of regional conflict management, we can see that, in the absence of regional organizations operating in the field of security, the competition between a regional power and an external challenger (like China) or a major regional challenger ( Fourth, it seems that the adoption of a conflict-management role on the part of a regional power can take place only under favorable conditions at the domestic, regional and international levels. The systematic identification of those conditions constitutes a further important field of future research.
